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Abstract
The bottom-up approach of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in the Paris
Agreement has led countries to self-determine their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction
targets. The planned ‘ratcheting-up’ process, which aims to ensure that the NDCs comply with
the overall goal of limiting global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C or even
1.5 °C, will most likely include some evaluation of ‘fairness’ of these reduction targets. In the
literature, fairness has been discussed around equity principles, for which many different
effort-sharing approaches have been proposed. In this research, we analysed how country-
level emission targets and carbon budgets can be derived based on such criteria. We apply
novel methods directly based on the global carbon budget, and, for comparison, more
commonly used methods using GHG mitigation pathways. For both, we studied the following
approaches: equal cumulative per capita emissions, contraction and convergence,
grandfathering, greenhouse development rights and ability to pay. As the results critically
depend on parameter settings, we used the wide authorship from a range of countries included
in this paper to determine default settings and sensitivity analyses. Results show that effort-
sharing approaches that (i) calculate required reduction targets in carbon budgets (relative to
baseline budgets) and/or (ii) take into account historical emissions when determining carbon
budgets can lead to (large) negative remaining carbon budgets for developed countries. This is
the case for the equal cumulative per capita approach and especially the greenhouse develop-
ment rights approach. Furthermore, for developed countries, all effort-sharing approaches
except grandfathering lead to more stringent budgets than cost-optimal budgets, indicating
that cost-optimal approaches do not lead to outcomes that can be regarded as fair according to
most effort-sharing approaches.
1 Introduction
As part of the Paris Agreement, almost all countries agreed to focus international climate
policy on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to limit the increase of
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global mean temperature to well below 2 °C and to pursue efforts to limit it further to
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. At the same time, the agreement allows countries to
formulate their own national targets in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs). This means that the evaluation of the NDC targets is needed in order to ensure
that their combined effort leads to the overall objective of the agreement. This evaluation
is referred to as the stocktaking process. Several studies have already started to evaluate
the combined NDCs with respect to their environmental effectiveness (van Soest et al.
2017; den Elzen et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2016a) or costs (Vandyck et al. 2016). The
question whether the contribution of individual countries (or regions) is in line with the
overall goal is, however, rather complex. In fact, discussions regarding the ‘fair’ contri-
bution of countries have been ongoing since the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Article 3 in 1992, specifying that the climate system
should be protected ‘in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capability’ (UNFCCC 1992). An extensive literature has emerged using
equity principles such as ‘responsibility’, ‘capability’, ‘equality’ and ‘sovereignty’ (Clarke
et al. 2014; Höhne et al. 2014) as the basis for several effort-sharing approaches.
Usually, effort-sharing approaches are used to calculate emissions allowances1 or
required emission reduction targets over time (BASICS experts 2011; Clarke et al. 2014;
Höhne et al. 2014; Pan et al. 2014, 2017; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016; Tavoni et al. 2015;
Wang et al. 2017; Holz et al. 2018). More recently, a different strand of effort-sharing
literature has started to focus on carbon budgets (Raupach et al. 2014). At the global scale,
the carbon budget approach is based on the strong linear relationship between long-term
temperature change and cumulative CO2 emissions, because of the long lifetime of CO2
and the main contribution of CO2 to anthropogenic warming (Stocker et al. 2013). As a
result, it is possible to derive global targets for cumulative CO2 emissions tolerable over a
certain period. Given these global targets, “fair” country-level budgets can be derived
based on effort-sharing approaches. Compared to annual GHG emission targets calcula-
tions, carbon budgets have the advantage that countries have more flexibility in deciding
their own pathway given the allocated budget - should countries attempt to incorporate
equity principles, but the disadvantage that they focus on CO2 emissions only.
This paper discusses a wide set of effort-sharing approaches. These are partly based on
novel methods for allocating national2 carbon budgets using effort-sharing approaches. At
the same time, results of pathway-based effort-sharing calculations are discussed, i.e.
GHG emission targets and implied carbon budgets (cumulative CO2 emissions of mitiga-
tion pathways). Both methods are based on the same global data to observe differences and
similarities between the novel (carbon budgets) and more conventional (GHG emission
pathways) methodologies (see Fig. 1). As a comparison with carbon budgets and GHG
emission targets based on effort sharing, a set of recently developed scenarios that
implement the different regional emission reduction pathways and carbon budgets based
on a cost-efficient allocation was used (McCollum et al. 2018).
This addresses the research question how national carbon budgets, in parallel to the more
commonly used emission pathways, differ between a wide set of effort-sharing approaches and
how these budgets compare to budgets based on the cost-optimal allocation. Due to the
1 Used here to refer to outcomes of effort sharing calculations, although these outcomes should not be seen as
top-down calculated targets for countries.
2 Although the European Union is included in this analysis, we refer to countries and national carbon budgets for
brevity.
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practical limitations of calculating time-dependent abatement costs within time-independent
carbon budgets, including these costs is beyond the scope of this research.
The literature has shown that outcomes of effort-sharing approaches depend signifi-
cantly on the parameter settings within each approach. We used the wide range of
authors of this paper from different countries to discuss the parameter settings (using a
systematic questionnaire). We explored the sensitivity to specific choices—selecting a
default value and sensitivity ranges. In the calculations, we show the effects of different
effort-sharing approaches on the allocation of emissions allowances consistent with
keeping global mean temperature below 1.5 °C by 2100 with > 66% likelihood (in line
with about 400 GtCO2 global carbon budget for the period 2011–2100) and 2 °C with >
66% likelihood (in line with about 1000 GtCO2 for 2011–2100) (Rogelj et al. 2016b;
IPCC 2014)3.
First, the methodology for calculating national carbon budgets and emission pathways
based on effort-sharing approaches is explained, including the key parameters. Subse-
quently, the resulting parameter sets are presented, as well as the outcomes for national
carbon budgets and GHG emission pathways. Carbon budgets refer specifically to CO2
emissions. For the pathways, however, we mainly present GHG results. Our results
provide input for the discussions on ratcheting-up of mitigation efforts, part of the
upcoming UNFCCC Global Stocktake. More specifically, our results can inform
policymakers by comparing NDC targets and implied cumulative emissions until 2030
to emission reduction targets and carbon budgets corresponding to effort-sharing ap-
proaches based on equity principles (for which a section is dedicated under the NDCs,
Winkler et al. 2017). As such, these results can inform discussions on how to distribute the
additional mitigation effort to close the emissions gap.
Fig. 1 Methodology including effort-sharing approaches categorised using equity principles. The effort-sharing
approaches are adapted from Höhne et al. (2014). The colours in box 3 represent different regions
3 Note that Millar et al. (2017) arrive at larger budgets, which can be explained by methodological differences
including the 2015 temperature reference and using a threshold exceedance budget. A larger global carbon
budget, however, would not affect our results in terms of differences between countries and approaches, only the
absolute values would change.
Climatic Change
2 Methods
2.1 Different effort-sharing approaches in this paper
There are different categorisations of effort-sharing approaches. In this research, we followed
the categorisation using equity principles of Höhne et al. (2014) and adjusted it to include the
grandfathering approach based on the sovereignty principle. In the paper, we selected six
different approaches: ‘per capita convergence’ (PCC), ‘equal cumulative per capita emissions’
(ECPC), ‘ability to pay’ (AP), ‘greenhouse development rights’ (GDR) and ‘grandfathering’
(GF), as well as the cost-optimal (CO) allocation. These six approaches span the range of
different approaches, as most of them relate directly to one of the equity principles introduced
earlier (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
2.2 Carbon budget and emission pathway calculations
Table 1 presents an overview of the calculations of carbon budgets and emission pathways for
the different effort-sharing approaches explored here (see also Online Resource Table S.1 for
equations). This analysis uses an effort-sharing framework incorporating a wide spectrum of
effort-sharing or burden-sharing approaches available in the literature, as presented in Table 1,
which all analyse the allocation of emissions allowances, reduction targets or carbon budgets
for different countries. Traditionally, studies first define a global level of GHG emissions in a
certain year or period, which is consistent with meeting a long-term climate objective (e.g.
400–450 ppm CO2e, as used in many recent studies), and then apply rules or criteria to allocate
efforts to countries with the aim of meeting the global emissions level (Höhne et al. 2014).
However, recent literature on mitigation scenarios has also focused on carbon budgets
(Raupach et al. 2014). In this paper, we have adapted different approaches to directly derive
national carbon budgets from the global carbon budget, and we index these approaches by an
asterisk (e.g. AP*) to distinguish them from the traditional emission allowances-based ap-
proaches (indicated without an asterisk, e.g. AP).
We applied the effort-sharing approaches by first defining either (i) a global GHG emissions
pathway or (ii) a global carbon budget, both consistent with limiting global warming to the
2 °C and 1.5 °C targets with a likely chance. The methods for (i) are the same as in the
literature, but for (ii), we made some adjustments, in such a way that they have the same
characteristics and underlying equity principles, but may differ in method of allocating the
countries’ carbon budgets under the global carbon budget. For the methods directly determin-
ing the carbon budgets we did not make any assumptions regarding the emission pathways.
2.3 Data collection
The global carbon budgets and emission pathways were based on the CD-LINKS dataset
(McCollum et al. 2018). Historical national GHG emissions until 2014 were collected from the
PRIMAP emissions database (Gutschow et al. 2016), to which historical GHG emissions
(excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) CO2) from the IMAGE model
were harmonised. For LULUCF CO2 emissions, the IMAGE data was used. The
Responsibility-Capacity Index (RCI) values necessary for the GDR* approach were based
on Kemp-Benedict et al. (2017), which represents historical emissions responsibility, income
(GDP per capita) and income distribution (Gini coefficient). The remaining data were used
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Table 1 Overview of effort-sharing approaches, underlying equity principles, basic tenets and calculation
methodology of effort-sharing approaches based on a global emission pathway and carbon budget, based on
own methods and existing literature (Höhne et al. 2014; Pan et al. 2017; Raupach et al. 2014)
Approach Equity principle Justification Methodology for the allocation of
emissions allowances, reduction
targets or carbon budgets to
countries or regions
1. Grandfathering
(GF*)
Sovereignty Falling under the category
‘acquired rights’, that is
justified by established
custom and usage.
Emission pathway: allocations of
emission allowances remain in
proportion to current (2010)
emission shares
Carbon budget: allocations of
carbon budgets based on current
emission shares
2. Immediate
per capita
convergence
(IEPC*)
Equality Based on the shared
humanity and equal
value of all humans,
having equal claim to
global collective goods
(equal individual rights
to atmospheric space);
i.e. no (relevant) dis-
tinctive characteristic
dictating some humans
should get more/less ac-
cess to an
indivisible/collective
good (Pan et al. 2014).
Emission pathway: allocations of
emissions allowance are
immediately in proportion to
population shares
Carbon budget: allocation of
national carbon budgets based
entirely on average (projected)
population shares in the period
2010–2100
3. Per capita
convergence
(PCC*)
Sovereignty/equality Combination of GF* and
IEPC*
Emission pathway: per capita
emissions allowances across
countries converge linearly over
time from current levels towards
equal per capita levels by a
convergence date, then
allowances are allocated based
on an equal per capita basis
Carbon budget: allocation of
national carbon budgets based
on both current emission shares
and population shares (i.e. a
combination of GF* and IEPC*)
4. Equal
cumulative per
capita emissions
(ECPC*)
Equality/responsibility A large amount of
cumulative emission
allowances per capita in
industrialised countries
has disproportionately
used global emission
space (Pan et al. 2014).
Carbon budget: allocation of
national carbon budgets based
on cumulative emissions per
capita in a certain period that is
equal across countries.
Incorporating historical
cumulative emissions
(responsibility) and based on the
share of the population (equality)
Emission pathway: not presented,
as is usually calculated from a
carbon budget
5. Ability to
pay (AP*)
Capability/need Based on the ability to bear
the burdens.
Emission pathway and carbon
budget: Emission or carbon
budget reduction targets from
baseline are allocated based on
annual GDP per capita (emission
pathway) or average GDP per
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from the reference SSP2 scenario, as implemented in the IMAGE model (van Vuuren et al.
2017) that included no-policy baseline emissions projections (including LULUCF CO2),
population and GDP (per capita). The IMAGE model was chosen for this purpose based on
the relatively detailed regional disaggregation and representation of different emission sources.
2.4 Parameter settings
The outcomes of effort-sharing approaches critically depend on parameter choices and
methods assumed to implement the approach. Several choices need to be made about
parameter settings. Therefore, ranges based on literature and several assumptions were pre-
sented to the authors of this paper who come from different countries across the world and
which are presented in the figures (see Table 2). A questionnaire was used (see Online
Resource Table S.2) to determine the parameter sets used for further calculations, with the
default settings representing the most chosen option (i.e. mode). A summary of the outcome of
the questionnaire is presented in the Online Resource Table S.3.
Table 1 (continued)
Approach Equity principle Justification Methodology for the allocation of
emissions allowances, reduction
targets or carbon budgets to
countries or regions
capita over the period
2010–2100 (budget approach),
taking into account increasing
marginal costs with steeper re-
ductions
6. Greenhouse
development
rights (GDR*)
Responsibility/
capability/need
Safeguarding people’s right
to ‘reach a dignified
level of sustainable
human development’
(Baer et al. 2008). GDR
is based on ‘Brazilian
Proposal’ (UNFCCC
1997; den Elzen et al.
2005).
Carbon budget: Considers both
responsibility and capability.
Emission reduction targets (or
global carbon budget) from
baseline are allocated based on a
Responsibility-Capacity Index
(RCI) that includes GDP per
capita and measures of the in-
come distribution. As data for
RCI is only available until 2030,
the RCI is kept constant from
2030 onwards to determine the
average RCI over the period
2010–2100.
Emission pathway: annual RCI
numbers are used, and from
2030, a linear convergence to
AP* outcomes are assumed.
7. Cost-optimal (CO) Cost-effectiveness Allowance according to the
least-cost options from
marginal abatement cost
(MAC) curves.
Allocations of emission allowances
based on mitigation potentials.
The emissions could be reduced
in each country to the extent that
the marginal costs of further
reductions are the same across
all countries. The allocation
highly depends on the assumed
marginal abatement cost (MAC)
curves.
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Some general settings apply to all approaches. One important parameter is the starting year
for the calculation of emissions allowances (i.e. whether the allocation has already started or a
delay should be implemented). Consistent with the literature (Robiou du Pont et al. 2016; Pan
et al. 2017; Höhne et al. 2014), we used 2010 as a starting point for the allocation of emissions
allowances or reduction targets. The choice of coverage of GHG emissions also matters, as
including all Kyoto GHG emissions including land use, land-use change and forestry
(LULUCF) emissions or only energy (and industrial processes)-related CO2 emissions, could
lead to significantly different outcomes. We used all GHG emissions for pathways and all CO2
emissions for carbon budgets as default and show energy and industry-related CO2 budgets as
a sensitivity analysis in Online Resource chapter 4.
The grandfathering (GF)* approach is, in its pure form, a relatively straightforward
approach, with limited variables and parameters. Previous studies have combined this ap-
proach with a participation threshold, to exclude lower-income countries from participating in
bearing the burden (Pan et al. 2017). Reasons not to include a participation threshold could be
transparency and the fact that many countries have committed themselves to the Paris
Agreement. No participation threshold was implemented, as the majority of respondents opted
for no participation threshold. Furthermore, not including a participation threshold increases
comparability with the other approaches that also do not include a threshold.
The immediate equal per capita emissions (IEPC)* approach in its pure form is a relatively
straightforward approach, with no additional parameter choice besides the general settings.
In the per capita convergence (PCC)* approach, a weighting factor is used for the carbon
budgets to determine how far the approach should weigh towards GF* (current emissions) or
IEPC* (population). We put the value right in the middle for the carbon budget approach, with
0.3 and 0.7 as sensitivity range. For the pathway approach, we used convergence years 2050
(default), 2075 and 2100.
The equal cumulative per capita emissions (ECPC)* approach takes into account histor-
ical emissions, discount factors and population shares. Firstly, concerning historical emis-
sions, different start years can be chosen. 1850 as a start year could be argued for, as it
represents the start of the industrial revolution. 1970 represents the beginning of the decade
in which scientists increasingly published about global warming, and from 1990, it was
clearly acknowledged that human activity was the cause of global warming, as described in
the first IPCC Scientific Assessment Report (1990). 1850 was taken as a default based on the
questionnaire results. Secondly, there are several reasons for discounting historical emissions.
One of the most important ones is technological progress. As a result of innovation and
technological R&D, energy efficiency increases over time, with the consequence that, for
example, much more steel and cement per unit carbon can be produced now than in the past.
This gives a latecomers’ advantage, which can be accounted for by discounting historical
emissions by the rate of emission efficiency improvement (0.8–2.0% per year according to
BASICS experts 2011; den Elzen et al. 2013). Another reason for discounting historical
emissions could be that emissions from the past would have a relatively smaller impact as
some of these have already decayed. Approximately 30% of CO2 is removed from the
atmosphere after 150 years, implying 0.8% removal per year (van Vuuren et al. 2011).
Therefore, the discount rate range of 1.6–2.8% per year was used, with a median estimate of
2% from literature (den Elzen et al. 2013; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016). Furthermore, the
historical population shares are used to calculate the debt (or excess) emission allowances,
and the future population shares are used to calculate the future emission allowances, which
are summed to determine the net emission allowances.
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For the ability to pay (AP)* approach, the average GDP per capita between 2011 and 2100
was used to determine relative reduction targets in the budget approach, and because this
approach is not dynamic, no participation threshold was assumed. For the pathway approach,
we included a participation threshold in the default case, which was set at such a per capita
income level that from 2050 onwards; all countries participate (which, for our scenario, is USD
2,800 when using MER and USD 5,500 when using PPP). Furthermore, we used GDP based
on purchasing power parity (PPP) as default. In our sensitivity runs, we included combinations
of market exchange rates (MER)-based GDP levels and the case without the participation
threshold to determine the total range.
The greenhouse development rights (GDR)* approach uses the Responsibility-Capacity
Index (RCI), which has a potentially variable weighting between responsibility and capacity.
Part of this index considers the historical emissions, so different start years can be chosen.
Similar to the ECPC* approach, we used 1850, 1970 and 1990 as starting years, with 1850 as
default. We also included the outcomes of sensitivity runs using RCI based fully on respon-
sibility and fully on capability.
The cost-optimal (CO*) approach is based on results from the CD-LINKS database
(McCollum et al. 2018). These scenarios assumed cost-optimal mitigation to start in 2020
(emission reductions are implemented where they are cheapest), meeting global carbon
budgets of 1000 (2 °C) or 400 GtCO2 (1.5 °C) over the twenty-first century. For comparison,
figures also show the No Policy (BAU*) scenario from the CD-LINKS database, which is
based on SSP2, a middle-of-the-road scenario that assumes no new climate policies are
implemented after 2010. Median, minimum and maximum values over all models reporting
these scenarios are presented for CO* and BAU*.
3 Results
3.1 Allocated carbon budgets and required reduction efforts
This section presents the carbon budgets and GHG emission allowances over time, based on
the different effort-sharing approaches, using the results of the questionnaire on the parameters
(see also Online Resource Chapters 2 and 3). When comparing the results of the emission
pathways and budgets, it should be noted that carbon budgets are independent of time and
represent CO2 only, while GHG emission pathways are time-dependent and include all GHG
emissions (including LULUCF). Therefore, this comparison is useful for determining similar-
ities or differences in trends, but budgets and pathways should not be compared on their
absolute numbers. As there was rare consensus on the parameter settings, the sensitivity ranges
of these parameter choices are presented in addition to the default values.
3.2 Results for default settings
Figure 2 summarises the results of the carbon budget approach in terms of national carbon budgets
(2011–2100) relative to each country’s 2010 CO2 emissions for all effort-sharing approaches,
compared to the cost-optimal national ‘budgets’ (cumulative emissions resulting from cost-
optimal scenarios). Online Resource Fig. S.1 and Fig. 3 illustrate the results for the emission
pathways’ approach, both in terms of GHG emission allowances over time (Fig. S.1) and in terms
of GHG emission reduction targets in 2030 relative to 2010 GHG emissions (Fig. 3).
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The most salient results are the extreme outcomes of the GDR* approach relative to all
other approaches. The default values (i.e. 1850 as starting year and capability and responsi-
bility given equal weight) lead to the largest budgets of all approaches for China and India and
the smallest budgets for the USA, EU and Japan—both for the budgets and for the pathways.
This is a result of a combination of relatively high historical emissions and high GDP per
capita for the latter group of countries—resulting in high RCIs. The approach even leads to
negative budgets for these countries. This is a consequence of the required reduction in the
global budget being allocated to countries and deducted from their BAU budget—and the
BAU emissions of the USA, EU, and Japan are projected to remain either constant or even
decrease. In other words, it is a combination of relatively low BAU budgets (compared to
history) and high RCI levels. For the pathways, emissions allowance allocations are negative
by or soon after 2030. For China, the carbon budgets are smaller than for India, given the
(much) higher GDP per capita levels and higher historical emissions. Combined, China and
India are allocated more than 80% of the global budget in this approach. Note that for the
pathways’ approach, GDR gradually moves to AP outcomes as RCI data was not available
from 2031 onwards, which explains the change in trend for the GDR pathways in Fig. S.1.
The AP* approach—while sharing some characteristics with the GDR* approach—shows
much smaller differences between countries. One reason is that responsibility is not taken into
account. Another reason is that unlike the RCI approach, reductions are not a linear function of
(responsibility and) capability, as we corrected for the shape of themarginal abatement cost curve
Fig. 2 Carbon budgets of different effort-sharing approaches by country. Carbon budgets are given in emission
years (2011–2100 CO2 budget/2010 emissions) and are based on a 1075 GtCO2 global carbon budget for the
period 2011–2100. Default values shown by the filled bars and error bars illustrate the sensitivity ranges. Three
combinations of parameter choices for GDR* are shown separately: sensitivity analysis on start year only
(1970/1850/1990) with RCI at 0.5 (default), the start year 1850 with RCI at 0 and the start year 1850 with
RCI at 1. USA United States of America, EU European Union, JPN Japan, RUS Russian Federation, CHN
China, IND India, BRA Brazil. BAU ‘no policy’ scenario from CD-LINKS, based on SSP2, with no new climate
policies assumed to be implemented after 2010; range based on different models, included for illustrative
purposes only. Note that India’s BAU is out of the range, and therefore indicated by its values
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in the AP* approach (for more details see Online Resource Table S.1). In practice, this means that
a country with a GDP per capita income that is twice as high as the global average GDP per
capita, the country’s relative reduction target is 26% larger (so if the average global reduction is
10%, the country needs to reduce 12.6%). This method leads to similar costs as the share of GDP,
and so to smaller differences between countries. For China, the AP* approach leads to the
smallest budget, as their GDP per capita is already above the world average and projected to still
increase strongly while having a low RCI. In the emission pathways, this is visible through the
AP approach resulting in a steady decrease in emission allowances to reach negative emission
allowances in 2070, while GDR allows for an increase in emission allowances towards a peaking
of about 40% above 2010 levels. Under a GF* approach, a relatively large budget is also
allocated, due to China’s high current emissions. Even though China also has a large population
share (IEPC*), they receive a larger budget based on current emissions. PCC* lies in between
these values. The ECPC* has a comparable budget, and thus a larger budget compared to PCC*
and GF*, due to China’s high population share and low historical emissions. As can be observed
in the emission pathways, China’s emission allowances are projected to rise significantly more
under the GF approach compared to the IEPC approach, for the same reasons.
The IEPC* approach gives outcomes similar to, but much less extreme than, the GDR*
approach, with negative budgets for the USA and Russia and about zero budgets for the EU,
Japan and Brazil (only with the default setting of including land use CO2 emissions). Together,
India and China are allocated about half of the total global carbon budget in this approach,
which is much less than the GDR* approach. As the IEPC approach implies immediate equal
per capita emission allowances for the emission pathways, India is allocated more allowances
Fig. 3 GHG emission targets in 2030 relative to 2010 emissions. Including LULUCF, based on 2 °C global
target. Default values shown by filled bars; error bars illustrate the sensitivity ranges. One combination of
parameter choices for GDR is shown: sensitivity analysis on start year only (1970/1850/1990) with RCI at 0.5
(default), where the default is always shown as part of the sensitivity range, even though default has the most
extreme parameter choice, i.e. 1850 vs. 1970–1990 in the sensitivity range. USA United States of America, EU
EuropeanUnion, JPN Japan, RUSRussian Federation, CHNChina, IND India, BRABrazil. NDC projections (green
bars and dotted lines) are based on den Elzen et al. (2016) (www.pbl.nl/indc) (default) and http://climateactiontracker.
org/. Note that the NDC projection for the USA refers to 2025, and for EU is excluding LULUCF. BAU (‘no policy’
scenario from the CD-LINKS dataset) included for illustrative purposes only
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than baseline emissions until about 2030. Nevertheless, the allocated budget is much smaller
than their baseline cumulative emissions. For the USA, the EU, Japan and Russia, the opposite
is the case: IEPC immediately leads to much lower allowances than current emission levels
given their current high per capita emission levels.
As expected, the GF* approach leads to relatively large budgets for countries with relatively
high current emissions per capita, such as the USA and Russia, and it leads to the smallest
budget for India. Presented relative to 2010 emission levels, the carbon budgets and emission
targets relative to 2010 emissions are the same across countries, as current emission levels
determine the budgets (Figs. 2 and 3).
The PCC* approach is a combination of the IEPC* and GF* approaches, with results in the
middle of these two approaches.
The ECPC* approach leads to themost extreme outcomes after GDR*: countries with relatively
high historical per capita emissions (notably the USA and Russia) are allocated negative budgets,
and Japan and the EU roughly zero budgets. Countries with low historical emissions per capita,
notably India, are allocated relatively large budgets but still smaller than the GDR* approach.
To summarise, the GDR* approach—as implemented in our study—leads to the most
extreme outcomes, with large budgets or emission allowances allocated to developing countries
compared to all other approaches. The ECPC* approach leads to the same trend in outcomes,
but less extreme. For most countries, the cost-optimal reductions are between the GF* and
PCC* allocations. For the USA, EU and Japan, all approaches except GF* lead to more
stringent budgets compared to cost-optimal allocation—suggesting that a uniform global carbon
price only leads to an equitable outcome based on the principle of acquired rights. The
differences between the approaches are very large for countries with very different GDP per
capita or per capita emission levels compared to the world average (USA, EU, Japan, India), but
are smaller for Brazil, China and Russia. For the USA, for instance, the allocated budget ranges
from less than −300 GtCO2 to 160 GtCO2 (about 30 times their current CO2 emissions). For the
EU, Japan and India, the differences between the approaches are even larger. It should be noted,
however, that for the GDR* approach, we kept RCI values constant after 2030, as no projection
was available beyond this year. As RCI values are likely to converge further after 2030, this
leads to an overestimation of the budget allocations for developing countries and underestima-
tion for developed countries. In the pathways’ calculations, we corrected for this by assuming a
linear convergence towards the AP results. This still leads to GDR resulting in the most extreme
results, but less extreme than under the budget approach (the implied carbon budget for the USA
would be –150 GtCO2 under the pathways approach instead of −300 GtCO2 under the budget
approach (Fig. 4). When only looking at 2030 targets, the results are slightly different. For
developed countries, GDR still leads to the most extreme outcomes, but for India, IEPC leads by
far to the largest emission allocation by 2030. Given India’s current low per capita emissions, in
the short term, IEPC leads to larger allocations than projected baseline emissions, which is by
definition not possible under the GDR approach.
In this research, we also calculated the indirect carbon budgets by subtracting remaining
cumulative non-CO2 GHGs (based on the cost-optimal reduction of the different GHGs) from the
total cumulative GHG emissions resulting from the pathways’ approach (see Fig. 4). Differences
between these indirect and direct carbon budgets can be explained by the variation in calculation
methodologies between carbon budgets and emission pathways. Firstly, in the GF*, IEPC* and
PCC* methodology for carbon budgets, instead of a convergence year as used in the emission
pathway calculations, a weighting factor was chosen, as carbon budget allocations are indepen-
dent of time. In addition, instead of reducing from current emissions, the global carbon budget was
Climatic Change
allocated based on a share irrespective of the country’s current emissions. Secondly, for the GDR*
and AP* approach, instead of a BAU pathway as used in the pathways’ calculations, an average
baseline over the whole period (2010–2100) was used to calculate the entitled national carbon
budget. Thirdly, for all approaches in the carbon budget calculations, instead of a global pathway
to 2 °C or 1.5 °C, the global carbon budget was used. Finally, for the GDR approach, we assumed
a linear convergence towards the AP approach in the pathways’ calculations from 2030 onwards,
leading to less extreme outcomes compared to the budget calculations.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
The general sensitivities analysed include the global ambition level (apart from the default
1000 GtCO2 budget, we included runs with 400 GtCO2 budget) and including (default) or
excluding land use CO2. The sensitivity values used and results are summarised in the Online
Resource Table. S.3. and the Online Resource Fig. S.2. Obviously, a more stringent global target
leads to more stringent budgets or pathways for all countries. However, the amount to which
national budgets decrease depends on the approach. For instance, under the GDR* approach, the
difference in carbon budgets between India and the USA is 820 GtCO2 (with India allocated the
largest budget) under a global budget of 1000 GtCO2 and 925 GtCO2 under a global carbon
budget of 400GtCO2. As such, theGDR* approach leads to evenmore extreme outcomes under
more stringent global budgets. However, for most of the other approaches, a more stringent
budget leads to smaller absolute differences in budget allocations between countries.
The effect of including or excluding LULUCF CO2 emissions mainly has a significant
effect on countries with relatively large LULUCF CO2 emissions, notably Brazil and India.
Fig. 4 Carbon budgets of different effort-sharing approaches per country. The carbon budgets (2011–2100) are
given in 2010 emission years. First and third row: based on 1075 GtCO2 global carbon budget, second and fourth
row based on 400 GtCO2 global carbon budget. Default values are shown as filled bars for direct carbon budgets,
circles for indirect carbon budgets. Three combinations of parameter choices for GDR* are shown separately:
sensitivity analysis on start year only (1970/1850/1990) with RCI at 0.5 (default), the start year 1850 with RCI at 0
and the start year 1850 with RCI at 1. For GDR*, the, default is always shown as part of the sensitivity range, even
though default has the most extreme parameter choice, i.e. 1850 vs. 1970–1990 in the sensitivity range. USA United
States of America, EU European Union, JPN Japan, RUS Russian Federation, CHN China, IND India, BRA Brazil
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Under the ECPC* approach, the budget of Brazil is much more stringent with, than without,
land use CO2, as including their historical land use CO2 emissions significantly increase their
historical per capita emission levels. For approaches that rely on projected BAU emissions, the
results can be ambiguous, as excluding LULUCF CO2 emissions not only affects historical
emissions (important for GDR*) but BAU emissions as well. For the GF* approach, this
distinction has no effect by definition, because the only determinant to allocate budgets or
emission allowances is population.
For all countries except India, the GDR* approach is the most sensitive to the different
parametrisations applied here. We analysed two different sensitivities for GDR*, i.e. start year
of the responsibility factor and the weighting towards either capability or responsibility. Of
those two parameters, the weighting factor has the largest effect on the results, especially for
those countries with relatively high or low emissions per capita compared to their GDP per
capita. A weighting towards capability, for instance, leads to much smaller budgets for
especially the EU and Japan, both of which have relatively low emissions per capita given
their GDP per capita level. For Russia, the opposite is the case: a weighting towards
responsibility leads to a much smaller budget given their relatively high emissions per capita
and low GDP per capita. This is also the case for Brazil, where high LULUCF CO2 emissions
also play an important role. The effect of the start year is especially important for the EU, the
USA, Russia and China. For the first three countries, starting in 1850 leads to much smaller
budgets than starting in 1990, while the opposite is the case for China. In numbers, the EU and
the USA are allocated about 90–100 GtCO2more and Russia 33GtCO2more if the starting year
is 1990 instead of 1850, while China would be allocated 95 GtCO2 and India 35 GtCO2 less.
The parameterisation of the AP* and ECPC* approach is especially relevant for India. For
AP*, the reason is that in terms of PPP, their income is much higher than in terms of MER. This
results in a larger budget (by 40 GtCO2) if the ability to pay would be based onMER. For China,
the budget would be 35GtCO2 higher. Likewise, the USA (by 35GtCO2), the EU (by 48 GtCO2)
and Japan (by 15 GtCO2) would be allocated smaller budgets if GDP were to be based onMER.
For ECPC*, the starting year is more important than the applied discount rate. Similar reasoning
as for GDR* holds here, with an especially larger budget for India and China for a starting year in
1850 compared to 1990 (the difference being 60 GtCO2 for both countries).
4 Conclusions
This research compared different methods and parameterisations of allocating carbon budgets and
reduction targets in emission pathways based on effort-sharing approaches for different equity
principles. The resulting allocations were compared to cost-optimal approaches based on global
optimisation model results (McCollum et al. 2018). We introduced novel methods to directly
calculate national carbon budgets from effort-sharing approaches, and showed how for some
methods, value judgments on parameter settings play an important role in the results.
Some approaches lead to extreme outcomes, which is a consequence of our staying as
closely as possible to the equity principle underlying the effort-sharing approach. Although
this represents a full range of outcomes, it means that some of the outcomes are clearly
impossible to achieve by domestic emission reductions alone. Although mitigation in countries
to achieve the reduction targets could be supported by a mixture of financing, emissions
trading and other mechanisms (which could be explored in future research), the outcomes of
the approaches should in any way not be regarded as top-down calculated targets and budgets
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for countries. Instead, they are meant to inform the discussions on ratcheting-up of mitigation
efforts, also in view of the upcoming UNFCCC Global Stocktake, in particular with regard to
the different notions of fairness, equity and efficiency of the distribution of effort across
countries. This implies that in terms of practical implementation, deliberative discussions are
needed between policymakers to share the effort of closing the emissions gap fairly.
Carbon budget and emission pathway calculations differ mostly as a function of the
different effort-sharing approaches. Still, results were also very sensitive to the parameters
chosen within a single approach. Most notably, AP and AP*, in which we considered the
choice of GDP (MER or PPP) and the inclusion or exclusion of a participation threshold,
showed a large range of outcomes, which was largely due to MER or PPP. Furthermore, the
variation in historical start year (i.e. 1850, 1970 or 1990) created significant differences in
equal cumulative per capita* (ECPC*) carbon budgets, in addition to the discount rate. Yet, the
historical start year did not influence the outcomes of GDR* as significantly, most likely due to
the relatively lower weighting towards historical emissions within the RCI compared to
ECPC* that focuses on responsibility entirely. The results presented in this research illustrate
the importance of parameter choices and calculation methodologies in order to represent effort-
sharing approaches, which accurately depict the underlying equity principles.
Apart from grandfathering, all effort-sharing approaches considered here lead to smaller,
and sometimes much smaller, carbon budgets for developed countries than the cost-optimal
budget. This indicates that cost-optimal approaches do not lead to outcomes that can be
regarded as fair according to most effort-sharing approaches.
In general, effort-sharing approaches that (i) calculate required reduction targets in carbon
budgets (relative to baseline budgets) and/or (ii) take into account historical emissions when
determining carbon budgets can lead to (large) negative remaining carbon budgets for developed
countries. This is the case for the equal cumulative per capita approach and especially the
greenhouse development rights approach, the latter showing much larger budgets for India, and
smaller budgets for EU, Japan and the USA compared to optimal budgets. Both approaches
allocate reduction targets below a (budget or pathway) BAU, and because the global reductions
are much larger than the global allowances, these approaches can lead to larger differences.
Furthermore, they can lead to the allocation of negative emissions allowances or budgets,
something which approaches that allocate budgets or emission allowances by definition cannot.
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